INTRODUCTION
conducted off the Cambodian coast and a check of lessons learned for applicability today will be beneficial to all who serve at the operational level.
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
On 12 May 1975, Cambodian Khmer Rouge forces seized the S.S. Mayaguez, an American container vessel, in international waters approximately sixty miles southwest of the Cambodian mainland. Prior to being boarded, the crew managed to send a distress signal that was heard by the Delta Exploration Company radio watch in Jakarta, Indonesia; this information was relayed to the American Embassy, Jakarta that notified Fifteen dead were the result of direct enemy engagement. All twenty three personnel aboard a helicopter were killed thirty seven miles west of Nakhon Phanom, Thailand while en route to Utapao during the initial staging of personnel assigned to the rescue attempt. outnumbered and taking heavy fire. The two groups on the western side were able to link up minutes before the arrival of the second assault wave. The Marines assigned to the second assault wave were en route to Koh Tang when the order to halt offensive operations was received. It was decided that they would be inserted on the island to allow for a safe disengagement and extraction from the island, but this was not without confusion and delay in their arrival since they were initially ordered to return to base and headed back to Utapao.
When it became clear that the battalion commander was insistent upon the second wave being landed, the helicopters were ordered to reverse course once more and head for Koh Tang.
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The extraction, which took two hours and was conducted almost entirely after dark (only the eastern beach extraction was completed in daylight hours), resulted in major damage to three more helicopters.
ANALYSIS
A closer look at the facts reveals a failure of command, control, communication and intelligence across the board.
Regarding command and control, the structure that was set up It is painfully obvious that the wheels are primed to fall off this communications wagon and make this mission more even difficult than it was to already going to be. However, the intelligence aspect will be addressed first since it will provide an obvious lead in to the communications problems. should be pointed out that at the operational and strategic level, communication capabilities existed that were both overand under utilized, the former likely causing the latter.
Perversely, the very excellence of electronic communications and the abundance of channels tying higher echelons of command together had become a major source of operational uncertainty.
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The leaders in Washington were listening and talking on the one frequency on which the ABCCC and ground forces were In this case, it appears no one asked for a second opinion. DIA would have given a much more sober diagnosis. The problem today is not likely to be a lack of intelligence information, as occurred in the Mayaguez incident, but having a so much information that it becomes problematic trying to synthesize it all. There are things we can do to help ourselves in this effort. In an age of Internet capability and with the advent of re-writable CDs, information on every area of the globe is available and can be used to update official intelligence estimates. However, the best intelligence, human intelligence, will continue to be the most difficult to acquire and should never be substituted for high tech capabilities whenever it exists.
Does any of this really apply today? One lesson that should be retained from the loss in Somalia of eighteen U.S.
Army personnel in a raid gone bad in October 1993, as it relates to Mayaguez, is that small scale operations against numerous and well-armed enemies far from friendly bases are apt to remain a staple of U.S. campaigns for the foreseeable future.
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The reduction in U.S. forces stationed overseas, increases in the number of crises occurring in widely separated geographic areas, the need for faster and more precise warning systems . . . have all helped to focus more critically the need for a truly outstanding C3 capability.
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These words were not spoken in 1998, but in 1978. Twenty years later their applicability remains right on the mark. 12 Guilmartin, 161, 13 Head, [85] [86] 
